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This  paper  provides  practical  techniques  to  policymakers  for  evaluating  the  potential 
economic effects of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). To this end, the paper discusses 
how  to  apply  three  methods:  (i)  trade  indicators,  (ii)  SMART  (Software  for  Market 
Analysis and Restrictions on Trade) in WITS (World Integrated Trade Solutions), and (iii) 
the  GTAP  (Global  Trade  Analysis  Project)  model.  The  paper  identifies  the  different 
aspects of an FTA that each method can evaluate, describes data sources and software 
requirements, specifies how to interpret the output from each method, and discusses the 
strengths and limitations of each method. To illustrate each method, there are examples 
applied to countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly 
Cambodia, Lao People‘s Democratic Republic, and Viet Nam. 
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analysis, preferential trade agreements, Asia 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  practical  methods  to  policymakers  for 
determining the potential economic effects of a free trade agreement (FTA), which is 
defined as the preferential liberalization of trade within a group of countries. In theory, 
the  net  welfare  effect  of  an  FTA  is  ambiguous  (Viner,  1950;  Lipsey,  1970;  and 
Panagariya, 2000). To determine how much a proposed FTA is worth, policymakers must 
turn to empirical methods. The methods differ mainly in terms of the questions about a 
proposed FTA that each method can answer. Broader and more multi-faceted questions 
will require more sophisticated, data-intensive methods. All of these methods require, at 
a minimum, some trade data, which come at  different levels of aggregation and are 
bilateral in nature. The choice of aggregation level and trade partners will depend on the 
questions being asked.  
The first section of this paper presents the simplest method, which makes use of trade 
indicators to draw specific inferences about the potential effects of joining an FTA. The 
trade indicators focus on the following questions:   
(i)  To what extent is trade intra-regional? 
(ii)   What is the comparative advantage of each FTA member? 
(iii)   Are a country‘s exports of a good regionally-oriented? 
(iv)   How complementary is trade between a given pair of FTA members? 
(v)   How similar are the exports of a given pair of FTA members? 
The main advantage of this method is that the data requirements for trade indicators are 
minimal, and therefore this method is easy to implement. However, the main drawback 
of these trade indicators is that they do not provide precise numbers that quantify the 
effects of an FTA on trade, production, consumption, or welfare.  
The  second  section  of  this  paper  presents  a  method,  which  is  grounded  in 
microeconomic theory, to provide some quantification of the economic effects of an FTA 
in an individual market. Policymakers may be interested in a particular market for its 
economic size, political importance, or for other reasons. This method is able to provide 
numeric answers to the following questions: 
(i)   How much will imports increase? 
(ii)   How much will exports from regional partners increase? 
(iii)   How much will exports from outsiders decrease? 
(iv)   How much will tariff revenue fall?  
 
Besides trade data, this method requires data on the initial tariff protection and values for 
certain behavioral parameters. The main advantage of this method is that it can quantify 
the effects of an FTA in a specific market at the most disaggregated level. The main 
disadvantage of this method is that it is a partial equilibrium method, meaning that it 
ignores interactions with other markets. 
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The third section in this paper presents the most sophisticated method of evaluating a 
proposed FTA. The method is based on a general equilibrium model—a model where all 
markets clear and interactions between them are accounted for. The method essentially 
simulates  a  real-world  scenario  and  introduces  a  policy  shock  such  as  an  FTA.  By 
studying the simulated changes caused by the FTA, this method is able to answer the 
following questions: 
(i)   How does real GDP change in a country that joins an FTA? 
(ii)   How does the country‘s trade balance change? 
(iii)   How do the country‘s terms of trade change? 
(iv)   How do import and export prices in a particular sector change? 
(v)   How does output and trade in different sectors within the country change? 
(vi)   Is there trade diversion? 
(vii)   How does the country‘s welfare change? 
(viii)   Where do these welfare effects come from?  
 
The main advantage of this third method is that, given FTA-related policy changes in 
various markets, the analysis can quantitatively capture the effects of these changes on 
all markets and not just one. However, this comes at a cost of modeling complexity and 
substantial data requirements.  
In general, the choice between methods will depend on which questions the policymaker 
wishes to answer as well as data availability. Each of the following methods contains 
examples  with  real-world  data  from  regions  encompassed  by  the  Association  of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union (EU), and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as individual countries such as Cambodia and 
Viet Nam. 
2.    Trade Indicators to Evaluate the Potential Economic 
Effects of an FTA 
 
A trade indicator is an index or a ratio used to describe and assess the state of trade 
flows  and  trade  patterns  of  a  particular  economy  (Mikic  and  Gilbert,  2007).  These 
indicators  are  easily  constructed  with  a  country‘s  trade  statistics,  which  are  readily 
available from national statistical offices or international sources.
1 In this section, we will 
present indicators of regional trade interdependence, revealed comparative advantage, 
regional  orientation  of  a  country‘s  exports,  and  similarity  or  complementarity  of  a 
country‘s exports with other trading partners. Given the simplicity of these indicators, 
they  can  be  used  at  the  initial  stage  of  any  trade  policy  decision-making  process, 
including the decision on whether or not to join an FTA. An important caveat is that these 
indicators cannot determine the causes of a particular state or trend in trade flows. 
                                                            
1  The United Nations Commodity Trade (COMTRADE) statistical database (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/    
comrade/) is used most often for trade data, especially for disaggregated information. The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund‘s (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) 
are good sources for aggregated trade data. Methods for Ex Ante Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements   |       3 
 
2.1   Indicators of Regional Trade Interdependence 
 
Before the formation of an FTA, it is important to know to what extent countries in a 
proposed FTA already trade with each other. Trade here refers to the sum of imports and 
exports. The indicators normally used as measures of existing trade interdependence 
are the intra-regional trade share and regional trade intensity. In this section, we will also 
introduce the regional trade introversion index.  
 
For each of these indicators, a high value may indicate that countries in the proposed 
FTA have lower trade costs with each other relative to trading with non-FTA countries. 
Here, trade costs are interpreted broadly to include all costs incurred in getting a good to 
the  final  user  other  than  the  marginal  cost  of  producing  the  good  itself,  including 
transportation costs (both freight costs and time costs), policy barriers (tariffs and non-
tariff barriers), information costs, contract enforcement costs, costs associated with the 
use  of  different  currencies,  legal  and  regulatory  costs,  and  local  distribution  costs 
(wholesale and retail). If a high value is indeed due to lower trade costs, then an FTA 
may be beneficial as it encourages trade between ―natural‖ trading partners. Conversely, 
if a low ratio is due to higher trade costs, then an FTA may be harmful as it promotes 
―unnatural‖ trade. 
 
2.1.1   Intra-Regional Trade Share 
 
The intra-regional trade share is defined as the ratio of trade between countries in the 
proposed  region  over  the  total  trade  of  all  these  countries. This  indicator  shows  the 
relative  importance  of  trade  within  the  region  versus  the  total  trade  of  all  regional 
members.  The intra-regional trade share of region i in mathematical form is: 
 
Intra-Regional Trade Sharei =  Tii / Ti 
 
where  
Tii = exports of region i to region i plus imports of region i from region i 
Ti  = total exports of region i to the world plus total imports of region i from the world 
 
The exports of region i to region i should be equal to the imports of region i from region i. 
Therefore, the numerator of this indicator can simply be twice the exports of region i to 
region i, or twice the imports of region i from region i. This indicator is simple to calculate 
and can be used by a single country or a group of countries to measure the regional 
direction of trade.  
 
However,  there  are  two  important  problems  in  its  use  as  shown  by  Anderson  and 
Norheim (1993). First, even if there were no regional bias in trade between members, 
the  intra-regional  trade  share  will  tend  to  be  higher  simply  because  there  are  more 
member countries. To see why, consider what happens to the intra-regional trade share 
if a region was simply split into more countries, thus keeping the region‘s trade with 
outsiders  constant.  Intra-regional  trade  would  increase  because  certain  erstwhile 
domestic  transactions  would  now  become  regional  export  and  import  flows. As  this 
increase  would  raise  the  numerator  more  than  the  denominator  of  the  intra-regional 
trade  share,  the  indicator  would  also  increase.  Second,  the  higher  the  share  of  the 4          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 52  
 
region‘s total trade out of world trade, the more likely regional members will be trading 
with each other and the less likely they will do so with non-members. The intra-regional 
trade share would be higher simply because members conduct more of the world‘s trade 
regardless of with whom.
2 When making comparisons of the intra -regional trade share 
over time or across groups  of countries, it is important to note if membership of the 
regional grouping changes and to compare how a region‘s total trade grows vis-à-vis the 
world‘s total trade. 
 
Figure  1  above  shows  trends  in  the  intra-regional  trade  shares  of  three  regional 
groupings: ASEAN,  EU27,  and  NAFTA.  Trade  data  was  used  for  1990–2008  for  all 
countries that were members of the respective regional groupings in 2008, even though 
the  membership  of  each  regional  grouping  expanded  during  these  two  decades.
3 
Therefore, the membership of each group is fixed in the calculations. It is clear that, on 
average, the share for the EU27 is larger than that for NAFTA, which in turn is larger 
than that for ASEAN. This shows that the higher the group‘s share of world trade, the 
higher the intra-regional share tends to be. Nevertheless, looking at the intra-regional 
trade shares over time, we can see that there is a slightly increasing trend for ASEAN 
from 17% in 1991 to 22% in 2008, a stabilizing trend for the EU27 over the same period, 
and  a  decreasing  trend  for  NAFTA  since  2001.  Did  the  new  members  of  ASEAN 
(Cambodia,  Lao  People‘s  Democratic  Republic [Lao  PDR],  Myanmar,  and  Viet  Nam) 
contribute  to  the  increasing  intra-ASEAN  trend? As  shown  in  Figure  1,  the  trend  is 
almost identical if the new members are excluded from the computations.
4 Although the 
total trade of these four new members increased from less than 1% of ASEAN‘s total 
trade in 2000 to about 9% in 2008 (ASEAN Statistical Yearbook, 2008), the trade of the 
ASEAN-6  (Brunei  Darussalam,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  Singapore,  and 














                                                            
2  For example, if the world were considered as a single region, then the intra-regional trade share would 
be equal to one, the maximum value. 
3  The EU had 12 members in 1990. Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined in 1995, followed by 10 new 
members (mainly Eastern European countries) in 2004, and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. NAFTA 
was signed in 1994. Prior to that, the US and Canada had signed a bilateral FTA in 1989. ASEAN 
comprised 6 member countries in 1990, and over the 1990s membership expanded to include Viet 
Nam (1995), Lao PDR and Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999). 
4  The bulk of trade data for Viet Nam and Cambodia is from 1999 onward. There is very little trade data 
for Myanmar and none for Lao PDR. Methods for Ex Ante Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements   |       5 
 
Figure 1: Intra-Regional Trade Shares of ASEAN, the EU27,  




Source: Author‘s computations with data sourced from UNComtrade. 
 
 
2.1.2   Intra-Regional Trade Intensity 
 
Intra-regional trade intensity is defined as the intra-regional trade share divided by the 
share of the region‘s total trade in world trade.
5 The numerator—the intra-regional trade 
share—can  be  thought  of  as  the  probability  that  any  USD1  worth  of  total  trade  of 
regional members is an intra-regional transaction. The denominator—the region‘s total 
trade share in world trade—can be thought of as the probability that any USD1 worth of 
world  trade  is  a  transaction  involving  at  least  one  regional  member.  The  closer  the 
numerator  and  denominator  are  in  value  (i.e.,  the  closer  is  the  intra-regional  trade 
intensity to the value of 1), then the more neutral is regional members‘ trade.
6 In other 
words, the region tends to not have any bias towards trading between its members or 
with outsiders. If the indicator is more than 1, then the region has a bias towards trading 
within itself; if the indicator is less than 1, then the region has a bias towards trading with 
outsiders. The intra-regional trade intensity will tend to rise when the share of a region‘s 
                                                            
5  This ratio is also called the ‗‗relative‘‘ measure of trade intensity (Petri, 1993) because intra-regional 
trade is measured relative to the region‘s share of world trade. 
6  This is in terms of ―geographic neutrality‖ (Kunimoto, 1977). Geographic neutrality is defined as the 
absence of a trading bias with any country or region, so each trade transaction involves a country or 
region according to its share in world trade. For example, suppose a region‘s share of world trade is 
10%.  If  geographic  neutrality  holds,  then  10%  of  all  trade  transactions  conducted  by  a  regional 
member  must  involve  another  regional  member.  In  other  words,  the  assumption  of  geographic 
neutrality implies that the intra-regional trade share equals the region‘s share of world trade. 6          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 52  
 
trade within itself rises faster than its share of world trade. The formula for the intra-
regional trade intensity is:
7  
 
Intra-Regional Trade Intensityi = [Tii / Ti] / [ Ti / TW]   
 
where  
Tii = exports of region i to region i plus imports of region i from region i  
Ti = total exports of region i to the world plus total imports of region i from the world  
TW = total world exports plus total world imports, which can be twice the value of world 
exports or twice the value of world imports since the value of world exports should equal 
world imports  
 
Figure  2  below  shows  the  evolution  of  the  intra-regional  trade  intensity  indices  of 
ASEAN,  the  EU27,  and  NAFTA  in  the  1990s  and  2000s.  We  observe  that  all  three 
regions  have  a  bias  towards  trading  within  themselves  because  their  index  values 
exceed one. The ASEAN region‘s index rose while the EU27‘s index stayed constant for 
the most part of these two decades, during which both regions‘ world trade shares were 
quite stable at around 6% and 40% respectively. As such, the rise in intra-ASEAN trade 
intensity was due to growth in intra-ASEAN trade, while intra-EU trade intensity hovered 
at 1.5 because intra-EU trade did not change much. During this period, the world trade 
share of NAFTA fell. As shown in Figure 2, the intra-regional trade intensity of NAFTA 
rose. This trend was due to a shrinking share of world trade as intra-NAFTA trade did not 
rise much over the period. 
 
The intra-regional trade intensity index has some limitations, which affect its use and 
interpretation (Iapadre, 2006). First, the maximum value of the index is a decreasing 
function  of  the  region‘s  total  trade. Therefore,  indices  computed  for  different  regions 
and/or periods are not perfectly comparable with each other given their different ranges. 
Second, the range below the threshold value of 1 is much smaller than above 1, which 
makes index changes in different parts of the range uncomparable.  Third, the index may 
be  inconsistent  with  its  complementary  indicator—the  extra-regional  trade  intensity 
index.
8  The  extra-regional  trade  intensity  index  measures  the  intensity  of  trade of 
countries in the region with those outside. Mathematically, it is possible for both the intra-
regional and extra-regional trade intensity indices to move in the same direction over 
time.  This  creates  a  problem  of  interpretation  because  regional  trade  cannot  be 






                                                            
7  Anderson and Norheim (1993) propose a correction to the intra-regional trade intensity formula so that 
the  index  is  precisely  equal  to  one  when  regional  trade  is  geographically  neutral.  To  perform  this 
correction, the denominator (Ti / TW) is replaced by [(Ti -1/n* Ti )/ (TW-1/n* Ti)], where n is the number of 
countries in the regional grouping. This correction is most useful if countries in the regional grouping 
each have a similar value of total trade. If not, the formula provided above is sufficient. 
8  The  formula  for  the  extra-regional  trade  intensity  index  is  equivalent  to  (1  –  Intra-Regional  Trade 
Share) / (1 – Region‘s Share of World Trade). Methods for Ex Ante Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements   |       7 
 
Figure 2: Intra-Regional Trade Intensity Indices of ASEAN, the EU27,  








2.1.3   Regional Trade Introversion Index 
 
Given  the  problems  of  the  previous  two  regional  trade  interdependence  indicators, 
Iapadre  (2006)  has  proposed  the  regional  trade  introversion  index  to  measure  the 
relative intensity of regional trading versus trading with outsiders. In this index, intra-
regional trade intensity (HIi) and extra-regional trade intensity (HEi) are functions of the 
region‘s share of outsider‘s total trade and not of world trade as in the previous trade 
intensity index. The index‘s range is [-1,1] and is independent of the size of the region.
9 
The index rises (or falls) only if the intensity of intra-regional trade grows more (or less) 
rapidly than that of extra-regional trade. If the index is equal to zero, then the region‘s 
trade is geographically neutral. If it is more than zero, then the region‘s trade has an 
intra-regional bias; if it is less than zero, then the region‘s trade has an extra-regional 
bias.  
 
The formula for the regional trade introversion index is the following:  
 





                                                            
9  The index is made symmetric around zero through a bilinear transformation of the ratio between the 
intra- and extra-regional trade intensity indices. 8          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 52  
 
where   
HIi = (T ii / Ti)/ (TOi / TO)  and HEi  = [1 –( T ii / Ti)]/ [1 – (TOi / TO)]   
Tii = exports of region i to region i plus imports of region i from region i  
Ti = total exports of region i to the world plus total imports of region i from the world  
TOi  =  exports of region i to outsiders plus imports of region i from outsiders 
TO = total exports of outsiders plus total imports of outsiders 
 
 
Figure 3: Trade Introversion Indices  of ASEAN, the EU27,  




   Source: Author‘s computations with data sourced from UNComtrade. 
 
 
Figure 3 above graphs the regional trade introversion indices for ASEAN, the EU27, and 
NAFTA in the 1990s and 2000s. The indices for all the three regions hover at 0.65 over 
most of the period, which points to intra-regional biases in trade. In the early 1990s, the 
EU27 index fell because the trade of the original EU12 turned inwards due to the Single 
European Act‘s mandate to establish a common market by 1992, shifting EU trade away 
from the countries that would later become EU members. In contrast, trade among the 
countries that would form the NAFTA and ASEAN blocs intensified in the early 1990s 
amid the negotiations for and in anticipation of the NAFTA and AFTA agreements signed 
in 1992. After 1993, as Figure 3 shows, all three regions display similar increasing trends 
in intra-regional trade. 
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2.2   Indicators  of  Comparative  Advantage,  Regional  Orientation,  Trade  
Complementarity, and Export Similarity 
 
If a country plans to join an FTA, it should have an idea of which of its sectors are 
relatively efficient. These sectors are most likely to have export potential. The sectors 
that are relatively inefficient are most likely to see increased imports. The country may 
also be interested in the extent to which the trade of all countries planning to join the FTA 
is complementary or similar. If trade is complementary (i.e., when one country exports 
products that another country imports), then the FTA is likely to be beneficial. If trade is 
similar (i.e., when two or more countries export similar products), then the FTA may not 
yield much benefit. This section presents indicators to broadly assess the potential effect 
of an FTA on a particular sector in a country that plans to join an FTA. For illlustrative 
purposes, we will use trade data provided by the UNComtrade database for ASEAN 
countries, the People‘s Republic of China (PRC), and Japan at the aggregate level and 
the  HS85  category  (Electrical  Machinery  &  Equipment  &  Parts,  Telecommunication 
Equipment & Parts, Sound Recorders, Television Recorders) from the year 2000. This 2-
digit HS category accounts for the largest share of ASEAN exports in terms of value. In 
most cases, data was unavailable for Brunei, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam. 
 
2.2.1   Revealed Comparative Advantage 
 
International  trade  theory  states  that  gains  from  trade  come  from  specialization  in  a 
country‘s  comparative  advantage (i.e.,  sectors  in  which  a  country  produces relatively 
more  efficiently  than  in  other  sectors).  The  revealed  comparative  advantage  (RCA) 
index, introduced by Balassa (1965), can be used to discover the products in which a 
country has a comparative advantage. It is defined as the ratio of a country‘s share of 
the  commodity  in  the  country‘s  total  exports  to  the  share  of  world  exports  of  the 
commodity  in  total  world  exports. A  country  is  said  to  have  a  revealed  comparative 
advantage  if  the  value  of  the  index  exceeds  one  and  a  revealed  comparative 
disadvantage  if  the  index‘s  value  is  below  one.  The  larger  the  difference  between 
countries‘ RCA indices, the more suitable they are as FTA partners.  
 
The formula for the RCA index is: 
 
Revealed Comparative Advantagecg= [Xcg / Xc] / [ XWg / XW]   
 
where  
Xcg = exports of good g by country c  
Xc = total exports of country c 
XWg = world exports of good g 
XW = total world exports   
 
For example, in the HS85 category of goods, the RCA indices of ASEAN countries, the 
PRC, and Japan in the year 2000 are, in decreasing order, Philippines (3.33), Singapore 
(2.46), Malaysia (2.37), Japan (1.55), Thailand (1.39), PRC (1.14), Indonesia (0.64), and 
Cambodia (0). By this index, the Philippines and Singapore are the most efficient in 
producing goods classified under HS85, while Indonesia and Cambodia are the least 
efficient. An FTA would benefit the former two countries as they have the largest export 10          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 52  
 
potential, while also benefitting the latter two since increased imports would displace 
inefficient domestic production.  
 
2.2.2   Regional Orientation 
 
The regional orientation index tells us whether a country‘s exports of a product are more 
oriented towards a particular region than to other destinations. It is defined as the ratio of 
two shares. The numerator is the share of the country‘s exports of the product to the 
region of interest in the country‘s total exports to the region. The denominator is the 
share of the country‘s exports of the product to other countries in the country‘s total 
exports to other countries. If the index has a value greater than 1, this implies that the 
country has a regional bias in exports of the product. Conversely, if the index is less than 
1, then the country has no regional bias. The index can be combined with the RCA index 
to discover which commodities‘ markets may experience trade diversion after an FTA. If 
a country‘s RCA index is less than 1 and its regional orientation index is more than 1, 
than an FTA between the country and the region may cause trade diversion. The formula 
for the regional orientation index is: 
 
Regional Orientationcgr= [Xcgr / Xcr] / [ Xcg-r / Xc-r]   
 
where  
Xcgr = exports of good g by country c to region r 
Xcr = total exports of country c to region r  
Xcg-r = exports of good g by country c to countries outside region 
Xc-r = total exports of good g to countries outside region r  
 
Continuing with our example, we measure the ASEAN regional orientation of exports by 
individual ASEAN countries, the PRC, and Japan in the HS85 category of goods. The 
computed regional orientation indices for the year 2000 are Cambodia (4.06), Indonesia 
(2.58), Japan (1.50), PRC (1.31), Philippines (1.24), Singapore (1.21), Malaysia (1.13), 
and Thailand (1.04). The computed values for all countries are above 1, which shows 
that all of these countries directed more of their HS85 exports to the ASEAN region than 
to other countries. The previous section showed that Cambodia and Indonesia did not 
have a comparative advantage in producing goods from the HS85 category in 2000. The 
high values for their regional orientation indices in the same year indicate that there may 
be trade diversion, i.e., Cambodia and Indonesia are replacing non-ASEAN countries as 
the source of ASEAN imports of HS85 goods. 
 
2.2.3   Complementarity 
 
This index measures the degree to which the export pattern of one country matches the 
import pattern of a region. It is defined as 1 minus the sum of the absolute value of the 
difference between the import category shares of the region and the export shares of the 




abs([Mrg / Mr] -[ Xcg / Xc])}/2   
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where  
Mrg = imports of good g by region r 
Mr = total imports of region r 
Xcg = exports of good g by country c  
Xc = total exports by country c   
 
The  index  takes  a  value  between  0  and  1,  with  zero  indicating  no  overlap  and  one 
indicating a perfect match in the import–export pattern. A high degree of complementarity 
may indicate more favorable prospects for a successful trade arrangement.  
 
To  illustrate,  we  will  individually  compute  the  complementarity  between  exports  from 
ASEAN countries, the PRC, and Japan with ASEAN imports in the year 2000 at the HS 
1-digit level (i.e., HS0 to HS9). The calculated complementarity indices are Malaysia 
(0.84), Japan (0.80), Singapore (0.79), Thailand (0.79), Philippines (0.73), PRC (0.69), 
Indonesia (0.55), and Cambodia (0.08). The results show that all these countries, except 
for Cambodia, have exports that match well with ASEAN‘s imports. We can infer that 
trade liberalization between the countries with high index values and ASEAN partners is 
likely to create gains as their exports match ASEAN‘s import demand.     
  
2.2.4   Export Similarity 
 
This index captures the degree of similarity between the export profiles of one country 
and other countries in a region. It is defined as the sum over export categories of the 
smaller  export  share,  comparing  the  export  share  of  the  country  with  that  of  other 
countries in the region.  
 




min([Xrg / Xr], [ Xcg / Xc])   
where  
Xrg = exports of good g by region r  
Xr = total exports of region r  
Xcg = exports of good g by country c  
Xc = total exports by country c   
 
The index ranges between 0 and 1. A value of zero indicates no overlap in the export 
profiles (i.e., the country is not a competitor with other countries in the region) and a 
value of one indicates perfect overlap. The more similar the export profiles are, then the 
more likely that there is limited potential for gains from inter-industry trade with a regional 
trading arrangement. This index does not consider gains from intra-industry trade.   
 
We compute the similarity index for the exports of individual ASEAN countries, Japan, 
and  the  PRC  in  relation  to  the  exports  of  other  ASEAN  countries  over  HS1-digit 
categories.  The  export  similarity  values  are  Malaysia  (0.88),  Japan  (0.77),  Thailand 
(0.77),  Singapore  (0.76),  Philippines  (0.73),  PRC  (0.70),  Indonesia  (0.51),  and 
Cambodia  (0.12).  Except  for  Indonesia  and  Cambodia,  these  countries  have  similar 12          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 52  
 
export structures compared with the ASEAN export structure. As such, gains from inter-
industry trade with further ASEAN trade liberalization may arise because of Indonesia‘s 
and Cambodia‘s export dissimilarity to the rest of ASEAN exports. 
 
2.3   Strengths and Limitations of Trade Indicators  
 
The  main  strengths  of  using  trade  indicators  is  that  they  are  relatively  easy  to 
understand,  their  data  requirements  are  easily  satisfied,  and  their  computation  is 
straightforward.
10  However, their main limitation is that, since these indicators are  
atheoretical, the interpretation of the results may be difficult. In addition, for the indicators 
presented in section 2.2, the results may be meaningless if the indicators are computed 
for trade categories that are too aggregated or unsuitably classified. To get more relevant 
information from these trade indicators, trade data could be reclassified according to a 
country‘s production structure and the computations performed at a more disaggregated 
level. Finally, these trade indicators are able to answer only a limited number of specific 
questions regarding an FTA. 
3.   Estimating the Potential Economic Effects of an FTA in an 
Individual Market 
 
Often, policymakers are interested in how an FTA will affect production, consumption, 
and trade flows in the domestic market for a single commodity. Policymakers may want 
to focus on this commodity because, for example, its trade is significant in the country‘s 
trade  balance,  it generates substantial tariff revenue,  its  production  occupies  a  large 
share of the country‘s workers, its output contributes significantly to GDP, or firms in the 
sector may be important political players. Some of the trade indicators discussed in the 
previous section may provide partial answers to questions about the economic effects of 
an FTA in an individual market, but for a more comprehensive analysis we have to turn 
to a simulation model that is based on standard microeconomic theory and supports 
trade policy analysis.  
 
We will consider a model that is partial equilibrium, as it focuses on only one market. The 
main advantage of the partial equilibrium versus the general equilibrium approach, which 
analyzes all markets simultaneously, is that relatively few data items are necessary. The 
only required data for a partial equilibrium analysis of an FTA are trade flows, the trade 
policy  (e.g.  tariffs),  and  values  for  some  behavioral  parameters  (mainly  elasticities). 
Another advantage is that it permits an analysis at a fairly disaggregated level, so the 
policymaker  can  focus  on  a  very  specific  commodity.  On  the  other  hand,  the  partial 
equilibrium  approach  may  miss  important  interactions  and  feedback  among  various 
markets. For example, a lower tariff on computer motherboards might also increase the 
import of power supply units or video cards as these are complements in production.  
 
                                                            
10  Some  of  these  trade  indicators  may  be  found  already  computed  at  the  following  websites:  ITC— 
http://www.intracen.org/menus/countries.htm;  World  Bank—http://www.worldbank.org/globaloutlook;  
UNCTAD—http://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx; and ARIC—http://aric. 
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3.1   The SMART Model 
 
In this section, we describe the framework of a partial equilibrium model known as the 
SMART model—Software for Market Analysis and Restrictions on Trade—that can be 
used in assessing the trade, tariff revenue, and welfare effects of an FTA. This model 
and the simulation tools are part of the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) trade 
database and software suite provided jointly by the World Bank and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
 
The SMART model focuses on the changes in imports into a particular market when 
there is a change in trade policy. The demand side of the market in SMART is based on 
the Armington assumption that commodities are differentiated by their country of origin. 
This assumption implies that, for a particular commodity, imports from one country are 
an  imperfect  substitute for  imports from  another  country. Thus,  even  though  an  FTA 
entails  preferential  trade  liberalization,  import  demand  does  not  completely  shift  to  a 
source from within the FTA. The SMART model also assumes that consumers‘ demand 
is decided in a two-stage optimization process that involves allocating their spending by 
commodity and by national variety. At the first stage, consumers decide how much to 
spend  on  the  commodity  given  changes  in  the  price  index  of  this  commodity.  The 
relationship between changes in the price index and the impact on import demand for 
this commodity is determined by a given import demand elasticity. At the second stage, 
the chosen level of spending for this commodity is allocated among the different national 
varieties, depending on the relative price of each variety. The extent of the between-
variety  response  to  a  change  in  the  relative  price  is  determined  by  the  substitution 
elasticity. 
 
Different countries compete to supply (export to) the market and the model simulates 
changes in the composition and volume of imports into that market after a tariff reduction 
or  another  change  in  trade  policy.  The  degree  of  responsiveness  of  each  foreign 
exporter‘s supply to changes in the price is known as the export supply elasticity. The 
SMART  model,  by  default,  assumes  that  the  export  supply  elasticity  of  each foreign 
country is infinite, which implies that each foreign country can export as much of the 
good as possible at a certain price. This assumption may be appropriate for an importing 
country whose import quantity is too small to affect the prices of foreign exporters (i.e., 
the price-taker assumption). If changes in the country‘s import quantity can have a price 
effect on the foreign exporter, SMART can operate with a finite export supply elasticity, 
but the value of this parameter must be found and incorporated into the analysis.  
 
In the SMART model, an FTA will affect both the price index of the commodity and the 
relative prices of the different national varieties. To illustrate, suppose there are three 
countries: A, B, and C. A imports a good from B and C, but A is forming an FTA only with 
B. Reducing the tariff  on imports from partner B will lower  the domestic price of the 
variety coming from B and the price index of the commodity. Domestic consumers will 
therefore want to purchase and import more of the commodity.
11 The cheaper price of 
imports from B relative to C also causes consumers to switch sourcing their imports from 
                                                            
11  This is called a trade creation effect in SMART, but it is not equivalent to Viner‘s definition of trade 
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C to B.
12 This substitution of imports is perfectly balanced in the SMART model so that 
the substitution does not affect the overall imported quantity, but simply reallocates 
market shares among foreign partners based on the new relative prices. The FTA does, 
however, result in an increase in imports from the country or countries benefiting from 
preferential trade because of lower prices. In sum, the importing country will experience 
an increase  in imports, FTA export partners will have an increase in exports, and 
outsiders will see their exports of the commodity fall.
13 Besides trade effects, SMART 
can calculate changes in tariff revenue as well. 
 
SMART requires the following data, which can be extracted from WITS or imported from 
alternative sources of information, for the simulation of an FTA: (i) the import value from 
each foreign partner, (ii) the tariff faced by each foreign partner, (iii) the import demand 
elasticity for the commodity, (iv) the export supply elasticity for the commodity, and (v) 
the substitution elasticity between varieties of the commodity. Note that SMART accepts 
just one import demand elasticity for the commodity and not for each national variety. 
Moreover, the export supply elasticity must be the same for all foreign exporters of the 
commodity. SMART also expects that the substitution elasticity is the same for any pair 
of varieties of the commodity.  
 
3.2   Example of Motorcycles Market in Lao PDR  
 
We  used  the  SMART  model  to  capture  the  economic  effects  of  preferential  tariff 
liberalization  in  Lao  PDR‘s  motorcycles  import  market  (HS871120). We  reduced  Lao 
PDR‘s  tariffs  to  zero  for  motorcycle  imports  from ASEAN  countries  to  simulate  what 
would have happened if Lao PDR had liberalized this market for ASEAN partners in the 
year 2000. We keep the pre-existing Laotian motorcycle tariffs on non-ASEAN countries 
at the same levels.  
 
Data from WITS show that all of Lao PDR‘s motorcycle imports in 2000 had a 40% 
import duty imposed regardless of national origin. Table 1 below shows that Thailand 
was the largest source of Lao PDR‘s motorcycle imports (with a 93% market share) 
followed by the PRC, Japan, Denmark, Republic of Korea (Korea), and France. For the 
simulation, import tariffs are reduced to zero for Thailand. All other countries continue to 
face a 40% tariff. We assume that Lao PDR‘s motorcycle market is too small to affect 
foreign export prices, so the foreign export supply elasticity is infinite. WITS provides the 
following  values  for  the  behavioral  parameters:  (i)  import  demand  elasticity  for  the 
commodity (1.5) and (ii) substitution elasticity between varieties of the commodity (0.69). 
As these elasticities were estimated using annual data, any simulated changes can be 
thought to occur within a year.  Table 1 below contains the simulation results. All non-
ASEAN exporters suffer a drop in their exports to Lao PDR. The total reduction of Lao 
PDR‘s motorcycle imports from non-ASEAN exporters is USD792,000, which results in a 
tariff  revenue  loss  of  USD322,000.  However,  there  is  an  increase  in  Lao  PDR‘s 
                                                            
12  This is called a trade diversion effect in the SMART model, although it does not exactly correspond to 
Viner‘s  definition of trade diversion. 
13  If the analysis includes finite export supply elasticities, then as the FTA increases the import demand of 
national varieties that have preferential tariffs, there will be an increase in the prices of these national 
varieties,  which  will temper the  final  quantities of imports  demanded of the  commodity  from these 
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Table 1: Exports into Lao PDR’s Motorcycle Market (USD Thousand) 
 







Changes in Tariff 
Revenue 
PRC  871120  1,425  881  -218 
Denmark  871120  228  145  -33 
France  871120  6  4  -1 
Japan  871120  438  277  -65 
Korea, Rep. of  871120  38  24  -6 
Thailand  871120  27,116  33,272  -10847 
 
Lao PDR = Lao People‘s Democratic Republic. 
Source: WITS. 
 
To approximate the increase in Laotian consumer surplus from additional imported Thai 
motorcycles,  we  can  use  the  following  formula:  ½*Initial  Ad  Valorem  Tariff  on 
Imports*Increase in Imports, which yields ½*0.4*USD6,156,000 = USD1,231,200. If the 
increase in consumer surplus on additional imports from FTA partners is smaller than the 
loss in tariff revenue from non-FTA partners, then the net welfare effect of the FTA is 
negative for the market being studied. In the example, the increase in consumer surplus 
due to more imports from FTA partners is USD1,231,200, which is larger than the loss in 
tariff revenue from non-FTA partners of USD322,000. Therefore, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the FTA may be beneficial for the Laotian motorcycle market. Note that 
we cannot say for sure that the FTA is beneficial because we are unable to compute the 
loss in consumer surplus due to reduced motorcycle imports from non-FTA partners. 
Furthermore,  the  SMART  calculations  do  not  account  for  changes  in  Lao  PDR‘s 
motorcycle  assembly  industry,  for  which  imported  motorcycle  parts  enter  duty-free 
already.  
 
3.3   Strengths and Limitations of the SMART Model 
 
The  strengths  of  the  SMART  model  are  that  it  is  easily  learned  and  implemented 
together with the WITS database, it yields important quantitative results on the trade and 
tariff  revenue  effects  of  an  FTA,  and  the  analysis  can  be  performed  at  the  most 
disaggregated level of trade data.  However, the main limitation of the SMART model is 
that it is a partial equilibrium model, which means the results of the model are limited to 
the direct effects of a trade policy change only in one market. The model, therefore, 
ignores  the  indirect  effects  of  trade  policy  changes  in  other  markets  (inter-industry 
effects) and feedback effects (the effects due to a trade policy change in a particular 16          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 52  
 
market that  spill  over  to  related  markets  and return  to  affect  the  original  market).  In 
addition, SMART does not return results on an FTA‘s effects on domestic production, 
which  may  be  of  interest  to  policymakers.  Further,  SMART  does  not  consider  the 
possibility  of  new  foreign  exporting  countries  serving  the  domestic  market.  Finally, 
SMART‘s results may be sensitive to the modeling assumptions and parameter values 
used.  Although  SMART  does  not  provide  a  built-in  sensitivity  analysis,  users  may 
perform this manually by changing parameter values over a reasonable range.  Table 2 
on the next page summarizes the essential characteristics of the SMART model and 
provides notes on implementing SMART for developing countries. 
 
 
Table 2: The SMART Model, FTA Analysis, and Developing Countries 
 
  Values/Variables  Notes on Implementation from a 




Imports are differentiated by national origin 
(Armington assumption). Therefore, an FTA 
does not shift all trade from non-members to 
members. 
 
The default foreign export supply elasticity is 
infinite, but SMART will accept a finite 
export supply elasticity.  
 
The import demand elasticity is the same for 
each national variety of the imported 
commodity. The export supply elasticity is 
the same for all foreign exporters of the 
commodity. The substitution elasticity is the 
same for any pair of varieties of the 
commodity. 
This is justified as countries often 
import different varieties from different 
countries because of quality 
differences.  
 
Most developing countries are price 
takers in world markets, justifying an 
infinite foreign export supply elasticity. 
 
Constraining these elasticities to be 
the same may not be realistic, but it 
reduces the number of required 
parameter values and facilitates the 
analysis. This is important for 
developing countries that may lack 
expertise in this type of analysis.  
Data included 
in the WITS 
database  
Combines COMTRADE, TRAINS, and WTO 
data on trade and tariff, para-tariff, and non-
tariff trade barriers from more than 170 
countries; includes parameter values for 
elasticities.   
If a developing country has more 
timely or reliable data, then it can 
supplement or replace the WITS trade 
and trade-barrier data used for the 
analysis.   
Important 
parameters 
(i)   Import-demand elasticity 
(ii)  Substitution elasticity 
 
These parameter values in SMART 
were estimated by the World Bank. 
They may be less reliable for 
developing countries. These values 
may be replaced by more accurate or 
reasonable ones.  
Output of the 
SMART model 
Changes in import value and tariff revenue 
for a single good by national source.  
The changes in import value are 
measures of trade creation and 
diversion. (SMART does not consider 
new sources of imports.) 
 
COMTRADE = United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, TRAINS= Trade Analysis and Information 
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4.   Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Estimation of the 
Potential Economic Effects of an FTA 
 
The partial equilibrium analysis of  an FTA captures, essentially, the effects of a tariff 
reduction in a single import market. However, FTA negotiations, in practice, encompass 
the removal of trade barriers across several sectors at the same time. To capture all the 
effects of multi-sectoral trade liberalization, a general equilibrium approach is necessary. 
A general equilibrium approach would not only reveal the direct effects of tariff reductions 
in individual markets, but also any indirect changes in related markets.  
 
For example, consider a tariff reduction on motor vehicles. A partial equilibrium analysis 
would simply focus on the direct effects on the motor vehicle market: a reduced import 
price  and  increased  imports.  A  general  equilibrium  analysis  would  account  for  any 
broader  effects  on  the economy.  It  would  trace  how  a  lower  tariff  on motor  vehicles 
affects the demand for substitutes (e.g., bicycles or train rides) or complementary goods 
(e.g., petroleum or tires). It would also consider how reducing the tariff on motor vehicles 
affects input markets that are related to the domestic production of motor vehicles. 
 
Cheaper imported motor vehicles would replace domestic production and, therefore, the 
demand for workers, machines, and raw materials. Changes in the prices of these inputs 
would  depend  on  how  important  the  domestic  motor  vehicle  industry  was  in  the 
employment of these inputs. For example, if the domestic motor vehicle industry was the 
major purchaser of domestic steel and the main employer of workers, then the price of 
domestic  steel  would  fall  and  workers  in  steel  factories  would  face  wage  cuts,  thus 
lowering  labor  income.  These  workers  could  reduce  their  consumption  demand  for 
various goods, including demand for motor vehicles, which would be an income effect.  
The tariff reduction in motor vehicles might also produce a feedback effect. The increase 
in imports of motor vehicles at the expense of domestically-produced motor vehicles 
could cause lower demand for domestic inputs and, therefore, a drop in input prices. 
This could, in turn, motivate domestic producers of motor vehicles to restore some of 
their output. Finally, the lower tariff would imply lower government revenue and, possibly, 
lower  government  spending,  some  of  which  might  be  in  the  form  of  sector-specific 
subsidies.  
 
As shown in the example above, the indirect effects of a single tariff reduction may be 
quite complex. This complexity increases with the number of trade policies and markets 
involved. As  FTAs  cover  multiple  sectors  and  various  trade  reforms,  they  are  often 
simulated  using  computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)  modeling.  This  modeling 
technique relies on standard microeconomic theory for rigor and consistency as well as 
computer algorithms for model-solving. 
 
Figure 4 above shows how a typical CGE analysis is conducted. To begin, the analyst 
needs  to  organize  a  dataset  about  the  economy  (or  economies)  concerned  from  a 
benchmark year. The data needed for a CGE analysis comes mainly from national input–
output tables that are organized into a social accounting matrix (SAM). A SAM extends 
the  sectoral  information  in  national  input–output  tables  to  include  data  on  the 
components of aggregate demand—   consumption, investment, government spending, 18          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 52  
 
and the external sector including exports and imports. The dataset should be consistent, 
meaning  that  the  numbers  reflect  an  equilibrium  as  specified  in  the  CGE  model. 
Equilibrium in a CGE model is defined as the set of values for all variables in the model 
that equates demand and supply in all markets.  
 
 




                               Source: (Shoven and Whalley, 1992). 
 
 
Next,  the  analyst  will  need  to  enter  values  for  the  parameters  of  the  model.  These 
parameters  comprise  price,  income,  and  substitution  elasticities.  These  elasticities 
measure  the  sensitivity  of  producers  and  consumers  to  relative  price  and  income 
changes. Their values, therefore, can have an important influence on the outcome of a 
CGE  simulation.  Some  of  these  parameters  will  have  values  that  are  derived  from 
statistical studies in the literature, while any parameters whose values remain unknown 
will  have  to  be calibrated.  Calibration  involves  computing  values for the  latter  set of 
parameters so that the analyst can reproduce the SAM values from the benchmark year. 
Once all parameter values in the model are set, the analyst must perform a replication 
check to verify that the equilibrium solution—the set of prices that clear all markets—
reproduces the SAM data from the benchmark year. 
 
Lastly, the analyst changes the values of any exogenous variable(s) to simulate policy 
changes in the correctly-specified CGE model from the previous step, thus yielding a 
new equilibrium. This new equilibrium is known as the counterfactual equilibrium. By Methods for Ex Ante Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements   |       19 
 
comparing the simulated changes between the benchmark and counterfactual equilibria, 
the  analyst  can  make  inferences  about  the  potential  effects  and  desirability  of  the 
simulated policy changes.
14 In a CGE analysis of trade policy, the analyst would typically 
study changes in output, exports and imports, factor prices, and welfare. 
 
4.1   The GTAP Model 
 
The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model, originally formulated by Hertel (1997), 
is the most widely used CGE model for analyzing trade policy.
15 The model is multi-
market, with markets for final goods, intermediate goods, traded goods, and factors of 
production. It is also multi-regional, with a region representing a country or a group of 
countries.  The  quantity  of  endowments —land,  skilled  labor,  unskilled  labor,  natural 
resources,  and  initial  capital—in  each  region  is  fixed  exogenously  within  the  GTAP 
model. The main agents in this model are producers, consumers, and the government. 
These  agents  are  styled  according  to  standard  neo-classical  axioms,  but  the  GTAP 
model  contains  particular  production  and  utility  functions.
16  Furthermore, the model 
assumes perfect competition and that prices will adjust to clear all markets. As the labor 
supply within each region is fixed and not mobile across regions, market clearing implies 
that there is no unemployment.  
 
Regions can trade with each other in the GTAP model. International trade in the GTAP 
model involves the shipping of commodities from a source to its destination region by an 
international  transport  sector,  which  buys  inputs  of  transport  from  various  regions. 
Importers buy the transport services, and the cost of transport creates the wedge 
between  the  free -on-board  (FOB)  and  cost,  insurance,  and freight   (CIF)  prices  of 
commodities. Both the transport sector and importers satisfy zero profit conditions in 
equilibrium  because  of  perfect  competition.  In  addition,  international  trade  is 
characterized by the Armington (1969) assumption, which implies substitu tability, albeit 
imperfect, between varieties of a good by national origin. As such, GTAP simulations do 
not  result  in  perfect  specialization  across  countries.  Given  balance  of  payments 
equilibrium,  each  region‘s  trade  balance  is  equal  and  opposite  to  its  capital  account 
balance,  which  is  the  difference  between  its  domestic  savings  and  investment.
17 
Because the basic GTAP model is static (i.e., there is no time dimension and, therefore, 
no dynamics for variables such as savings or investment), the GTAP model  features a 
―global bank‖ that collects funds from regions that are net savers and invests them in 
regions that are net investors until the marginal investment equates the expected rates 
of return from all regions.  
                                                            
14  Studying any changes in the levels of the endogenous variables from one equilibrium to another is 
known as a comparative static analysis or a counterfactual analysis. 
15  The theory underlying the GTAP model is based on the ORANI model of the Australian economy, 
which was developed by Dixon et al., (1982). 
16  GTAP  uses  nested  constant  elasticity  of  substitution  (CES)  and  Leontief  functions  to  model  the 
production technology, which implies constant returns to scale. The model uses nested Cobb–Douglas 
and constant difference in elasticity (CDE) functions to capture the contribution of private, government, 
and savings demand to regional demand, and the claims of each of these three areas represent a 
constant share of income (Hertel, 1997, Chapter 2). 
17  The GTAP model ignores unilateral transfers and gifts between countries. 20          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 52  
 
GTAP  also  houses  a  database  that  currently  contains  SAMs  for  113  countries; 
production, endowment, and bilateral trade data; and values for all parameters in the 
GTAP model.
18 The ready availability of this information and related software makes 
implementing the GTAP model easy. For a CGE analysi s of trade policies such as 
import-tariff reductions in an FTA, a combination of user -friendly, menu-driven software 
such as  AggGTAP and RunGTAP can be used to obtain results. These two software 
programs were created specifically for  use with the GTAP database,  and they make 
CGE analysis convenient. Although the GTAP model and database are suitable for a 
wide-range of trade policy analyses, the model, data, and/or parameters may have to be 
modified for the simulation of complex trade (e.g., tariff-rate quotas, export subsidies, 
service trade barriers, technical trade barriers, overlapping FTAs) or other policies such 
as  investment,  migration,  or  energy  policies.
19  To  illustrate  how  simple,  yet 
comprehensive, a CGE analysis can be with the tools provided by GT AP, we will 
consider the case of the FTA among ASEAN countries, focusing on the effects of 
preferential trade liberalization on the newest members. 
 
4.2   Example of CGE analysis of an FTA: GTAP simulation of the effects 
of the ASEAN FTA on Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Viet Nam 
 
To focus attention on certain countries, the data for a CGE analysis is often aggregated 
by regions, sectors, and factors. In this example, the data on the 113 countries provided 
in the GTAP database are aggregated into 13 regions: nine ASEAN countries (excluding 
Brunei Darussalam because it is not in the GTAP database); the PRC; Japan; the rest of 
East Asia (including Hong Kong, China; Republic of Korea; and Taipei,China); and the 
rest of the world. The GTAP database contains data on 57 sectors, which have been 
aggregated into 10 sectors according to the nature of outputs. In the analysis below, we 
will refer to the first three aggregated sectors as primary, the next four as secondary, and 
the final three as tertiary.  
 
The five factors included in the GTAP database are: land, natural resources, unskilled 
labor, skilled labor, and capital. These are left disaggregated in this example. As per the 
GTAP model, land and natural resources are assumed to be perfectly immobile between 
sectors  but  unskilled  labor,  skilled  labor,  and  capital  are  perfectly  mobile.
20  The 
benchmark year for this CGE analysis is 2004 as the data from the GTAP database is 
from this year. We perform a simulation of the ASEAN FTA. Our scenario is simply that 
the ad valorem tariffs on imports from ASEAN countries into other ASEAN countries are 
all reduced to zero. For our simulation, the closure (i.e., the treatment of equilibrium in 
the model) used is the standard GTAP multiregional general equilibrium closure. The 
solution algorithm used is the Gragg 4 8 12 method with automatic accuracy to get a 
high level of precision in the results. 
                                                            
18  The current version of the GTAP database is version 7. It can be accessed for a fee, although some 
previous versions are free. More information about the GTAP database and the GTAP model can be 
found at  http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/ 
19  In GTAP, policy measures are modeled as ad valorem price wedges. These price wedges can be 
between the domestic and world market prices  (border measures) or between domestic producer and 
consumer prices (output taxes or subsidies). 
20  The degree of inter-sectoral mobility of each factor may be adjusted in GTAPAgg. Methods for Ex Ante Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements   |       21 
 
Table 3: Aggregation of GTAP Sectors 
 
   Aggregated Sectors  Disaggregated Sectors 
1  Grains and Crops  Paddy rice; Wheat; Cereal grains nec; Vegetables, Fruit, 
Nuts; Oil seeds; Sugar cane, Sugar beet; Plant-based fibers; 
Crops nec; Processed rice. 
2  Livestock and Meat Products  Cattle, Sheep, Goats, Horses; Animal products nec; Raw 
milk; Wool, Silk-worm cocoons; Meat; Meat products nec. 
3  Mining and Extraction  Forestry; Fishing; Coal; Oil; Gas; Minerals nec. 
4  Processed Food  Vegetable oils and fats; Dairy products; Sugar; Food products 
nec; Beverages and tobacco products. 
5  Textiles and Clothing  Textiles; Wearing apparel. 
6  Light Manufacturing  Leather products; Wood products; Paper products, 
publishing; Metal products; Motor vehicles and parts; 
Transport equipment nec; Manufactures nec. 
7  Heavy Manufacturing  Petroleum, coal products; Chemical, rubber, plastic prods; 
Mineral products nec; Ferrous metals; Metals nec; Electronic 
equipment; Machinery and equipment nec. 
8  Utilities and Construction  Electricity; Gas manufacture, distribution; Water; 
Construction. 
9  Transport and Communication  Trade; Transport nec; Sea transport; Air transport; 
Communication. 
10  Other Services  Financial services nec; Insurance; Business services nec; 
Recreation and other services; Public 
Administration/Defense/Health/Education; Dwellings. 
 
  Source: GTAP database, (nec = not elsewhere classified). 
 
 
4.2.1   Simulated Aggregate Effects 
 
Table 4 reports aggregated ad valorem import tariffs used in the simulation. They have 
been aggregated to get a broad overview of patterns of import protection in ASEAN 
countries. The most protected sectors are (i) processed food and (ii) grains and crops, 
while the least protected is mining and extraction. Singapore, being a free entrepô t for 
goods, does not have any import tariffs. As there is no data in the GTAP database on 
trade barriers on services, we do not have any tariffs for (i) utilities and construction, (ii) 
transportation and communications, and (iii) other services.
21   
 
                                                            
21  The GTAP database does, however, have data on trade in services. 22          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 52  
 
Table 4: ASEAN Ad Valorem Import Tariffs (2004) 
 
  Cambodia  Indonesia  Lao PDR  Malaysia  Myanmar  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand  Viet Nam 
Grains and Crops  8  5  8  49  3  12  0  25  8 
Meat and Livestock  12  2  7  1  4  9  0  5  9 
Mining and Extraction  7  1  1  1  1  2  0  2  3 
Processed Food  16  9  20  45  8  4  0  30  30 
Textile and Clothing  11  4  7  9  7  4  0  14  18 
Light Manufacturing  20  5  16  10  4  5  0  10  14 
Heavy Manufacturing  14  2  6  2  3  2  0  4  5 
Utilities and 
Construction 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Transportation and 
Communication 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
 
Note: (i) The numbers above do not include non-tariff barriers. (ii) The tariff for each country‘s sector is an aggregation that first takes the trade-
weighted average tariff over each sub-sector for each partner and then takes the simple average over all partners. (iii) The GTAP variable used 
for the ad valorem import tariffs is rTMS. 
Source: GTAP Database. 
 
 
Table 5 shows the simulated aggregate effects of the ASEAN FTA. In terms of real GDP, 
the ASEAN FTA causes an absolute percentage change of no more than 0.2% in all 
ASEAN countries and almost no change in the PRC, Japan, the rest of East Asia, and 
the rest of the world. It is interesting to note that, as a result of the ASEAN FTA, there is 
a contraction of real GDP in the new ASEAN members (particularly in Viet Nam) and 
Thailand, but an expansion of real GDP in the other ASEAN members (particularly in Lao 
PDR). As for trade, all ASEAN countries experience an increase in export values and 
volumes with Singapore‘s trade expansion being the highest. All ASEAN countries have 
a larger increase in imports than in exports, worsening their trade balances, but it is 
important to note that the pre-simulation trade balances in 2004 of all ASEAN countries 
was in surplus except for Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam. For non-ASEAN countries, 
the  results  show  that  exports  from  the  PRC  and  the  rest  of  East Asia  shrink,  while 
Japan‘s exports increase. This indicates that the ASEAN FTA causes some degree of 
trade diversion from the PRC and the rest of East Asia. The imports of non-ASEAN 
countries are also shown to fall. As for the terms of trade, the simulation results in an 
improvement for six out of the nine ASEAN countries (particularly for Cambodia), but a 
deterioration  for  non-ASEAN  countries.  As  a  whole,  the  ASEAN  FTA  causes  an 
improvement in the ASEAN region‘s terms of trade. 
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in Export  
Value (USD 
Million) 
Change in  
Import Value  
(USD Million) 
% Change  
in Export 
Volume 




in Terms  
of Trade 
Cambodia  -0.1  327.5  377.8  5.92  11.62  1.6 
Indonesia  0.03  1321.3  1481.1  1.29  1.84  0.13 
Lao PDR  0.18  70.7  104  10.76  10.87  -0.3 
Malaysia  0.16  1198.9  1611.4  0.65  1.36  -0.02 
Myanmar  -0.01  58.4  73.3  2  2.14  -0.15 
Philippines  0.09  562.1  721.9  0.82  1.41  0.21 
Singapore  0.05  1865.2  2076.2  0.5  1.26  0.61 
Thailand  -0.03  453.8  3601.2  -0.25  3.47  0.59 
Viet Nam  -0.2  668.8  1500.6  1.83  4  0.13 
PRC  0  -462.2  -551.9  -0.04  -0.12  -0.05 
Japan  0  189  -563.8  0.07  -0.13  -0.06 
Rest of East Asia  0  -295.3  -332.8  -0.01  -0.08  -0.04 
Rest of the World  0  287.2  -3101.4  0.02  -0.04  -0.01 
 
Notes: The GTAP variables used are: (i) qgdp for Real GDP, (ii) VXWD for export value, (iii) VIWS for import value, (iv) 
VXWD for the initial level of exports and VIWS for the initial level of imports and DQXS for the volume change in exports 
and imports, and (v) tot for the terms of trade. 
 
Source: Author's results from a GTAP simulation. 
 
 
4.2.2   Simulated Sectoral Effects 
 
To illustrate the sectoral effects of the ASEAN FTA and keep the analysis tractable, we 
will focus on two countries: Cambodia and Viet Nam. These two countries were selected 
because they are two of the newer ASEAN members and the simulation results in the 
most  negative percentage reductions in their real GDP, even though they have some of 
the highest pre-simulation levels of import protection. In the analysis below, we will not 
consider changes in the tertiary sector because of a lack of data on trade barriers and 
uncertainty in the quality of data. 
 
The ASEAN FTA produces mixed effects on different sectors in Cambodia as shown in 
Table 6. The Grains and Crops sector has the largest relative output expansion (14.73%) 
driven by an increase in export volume. The export price for Cambodia‘s Grains and 
Crops increases by 0.47%, which is the largest percentage change for any sector in any 
country. The export volume of Cambodia‘s Grains and Crops rises more than four-fold, 24          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 52  
 
which  is  the  largest  relative  increase  for  any  country‘s  sector.  In  the  results,  most 
countries‘  sectors  have  absolute  percentage  changes  of  less  than  0.05%  for  export 
prices and less than 0.5% for export volume. In this simulation, the percentage change 
in export price turns out to be equal to the percentage change in the domestic price in 
each  country‘s  sector.  Although  the  export/domestic  price  increases  by  0.24%  in 
Cambodia‘s Livestock and Meat Products sector, there is a drop in output and export 
volumes. This is due to an increase in imports (1.41%), which substitute for and reduce 
the domestic supply of Livestock and Meat Products in Cambodia‘s domestic market.  
 
 













in Import  
Price 
% Change 
in Import Volume 
Grains and Crops  14.73  0.47  421.22  -0.03  1.15 
Livestock and Meat Products  -8.19  0.24  -77.17  -0.11  1.41 
Mining and Extraction  -4.17  -0.03  40.99  -0.03  -0.12 
Processed Food  -22.31  0.1  5.15  -0.15  0.25 
Textiles and Clothing  0.78  0  1.77  -0.04  0.04 
Light Manufacturing  -4.85  -0.02  9.32  -0.09  0.15 
Heavy Manufacturing  -12.94  0  2.40  -0.08  0.08 
Utilities and Construction  7.01  -0.01  2.92  0  0.08 
Transport and Communication  -2.84  0.02  -6.25  0  0.02 
Other Services  -2.45  0.04  -13.06  0  0.06 
 
Note: The GTAP variables used to calculate percentage changes are (i) qo for domestic output, (ii) pxw for export price 
(equal to pm, or output price, in this simulation); and (iii) VXWD for the initial level of exports and VIWS for the initial level 
of imports and DQXS for the volume change in exports and imports. 
 
Source: Author's results from a GTAP simulation.  
 
The  only  secondary  sector  that  expands  is Textiles  and  Clothing,  mainly  due  to  the 
expansion of exports under ASEAN tariff preferences.
22 All other primary and secondary 
sectors see their output shrink, with the largest relative fall in Processed Food   (–
22.31%).  Output  in  this  sector  is  displaced  by  imports  because  the  sector  sees  the 
largest relative fall in import prices (–0.15%) and the largest absolute increase in import 
volumes  at  USD82.8 million  in  2004  US  dollars  (not  shown  in  the  table),  which 
corresponds to a 0.25% increase across sectors. The contraction in Cambodia‘s real 
GDP is due, in order of importance, to Processed Food, Heavy Manufacturing, and Light 
Manufacturing. Import volumes increase in all sectors except for Mining and Extraction. 
                                                            
22  Note  that  this  simulation  focuses  only  on  the  effects  of  the ASEAN  FTA  on  trade  in  textiles  and 
clothing. It does not consider the possible effects of the phasing out of the Multi-Fibre Agreement. Methods for Ex Ante Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements   |       25 
 
The general increase in import volumes can be attributed to tariff reductions and drops in 
import prices in all the primary and secondary sectors. 
Table  7  below  shows  how  Vietnamese  sectoral  output  and  trade  change  due  to  the 
simulated  ASEAN  FTA.  Except  for  the  Grains  and  Crops  sector,  all  primary  and 
secondary  sectors  experience  a  contraction  in  output. The  Grains  and  Crops  sector 
shows the largest relative increase in export price and volume. However, the general 
contraction  in  most  sectors,  especially  in  the  Processed  Food  and  Other  Services 
sectors,  explains  the  negative  movement  in  Viet  Nam‘s  real  GDP.  This  is 
counterbalanced to a limited degree by some growth in the Utilities and Construction 
sector. The Processed Food sector displays the largest relative drop (–4.02%), which 
can be traced to an increased import volume of about 16%. The import price of the 
Processed Food sector drops the most in percentage terms relative to other sectors. All 
primary and secondary sectors experience an increase in import volumes. 
 
 


















Grains and Crops  0.98  0.03  6.80  0  4.99 
Livestock and Meat Products  -0.66  0.01  -3.25  0  2.91 
Mining and Extraction  -0.71  0  -0.63  0  2.01 
Processed Food  -4.02  0  3.26  -0.12  15.99 
Textiles and Clothing  -0.24  0  0.69  -0.01  1.86 
Light Manufacturing  -0.33  0  1.41  -0.02  5.21 
Heavy Manufacturing  -0.28  0  6.00  -0.02  3.17 
Utilities and Construction  3.47  0  -1.99  0  5.93 
Transport and Communication  0.4  -0.01  2.16  0  -0.82 
Other Services  -1.36  0.01  -3.46  0  0.83 
Notes: The GTAP variables used to calculate percentage changes are: (i) qo for domestic output, (ii) pxw for export price 
(equal to pm, i.e., output price, in this simulation); and (iii) VXWD for the initial level of exports, VIWS for the initial level of 
imports, and DQXS for the volume change in exports and imports. 
Source: Author's results from a GTAP simulation. 
 
 
4.2.3   Simulated Welfare Effects of the ASEAN FTA 
 
The GTAP model also computes a measure of the change in each region‘s welfare. The 
change in welfare for each region is the equivalent variation, i.e., the change in money 
income that would produce the same effect on the region‘s utility as the policy shock. 
The GTAP model also conveniently produces a decomposition of the welfare change into 
five sources: (i) allocative efficiency, (ii) endowment effects, (iii) technical changes, (iv) 26          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 52  
 
terms  of  trade  effects,  and  (v)  investment–savings  effects. As  our  simulation  of  the 
ASEAN FTA does not include any changes in endowment or technical and productivity 
parameters, no welfare effects can be attributed to these two sources. The simulation‘s 
welfare results are due only to changes in allocative efficiency (the efficiency of resource 
utilization), terms of trade (the change in the relative price of exports to imports both 
weighted by benchmark-year quantities), and investment returns on the capital account 
(the returns on the difference between domestic savings and investment). 
 
 
Table 8: Simulated Welfare Effects of ASEAN FTA and Decomposition  
(USD Million) 
 
WELFARE  Allocative 
Efficiency 
Terms of Trade 
Effects 
Investment-
Savings Effects  Total 
Cambodia  -4.8  717  22  88.9 
Indonesia  85  119.7  -13  191.6 
Lao PDR  4.3  -2.9  -2.3  -0.9 
Malaysia  186.8  30.7  -12.3  205.1 
Myanmar  -0.4  -4.8  -1.2  -6.4 
Philippines  72  108.5  -2.8  177.7 
Singapore  57.5  1011.2  -28.8  1039.9 
Thailand  -54  717.2  -73.8  589.4 
Viet Nam  -84.8  37.5  -15.4  62.7 
PRC  -3.2  -346.2  45.5  -303.8 
Japan  -47.9  -.349.8  60.3  -337.4 
Rest of East Asia  -49.5  -253.7  44.3  -259 
Rest of the World  -295.6  -1146.7  -22.1  -1465.3 
Total  -135.7  -7.5  0.5  -142.8 
Note: The GTAP variable containing the decomposed numbers above is WELFARE. 
Source: Author's results from a GTAP simulation. 
 
 
The rightmost column of Table 8 shows the total welfare change for each country or 
region. There are three observations we can make about the ASEAN countries with a 
positive  total  welfare  change.  First,  Singapore  receives  the  largest  net welfare gains 
from the ASEAN FTA followed by Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 
Singapore‘s welfare gains come mainly from large and positive terms of trade effects. 
Since Singapore began with no import tariffs, there was no change in its import prices 
but increases in all its export prices due to tariff reductions among its trade partners. 
Therefore, Singapore‘s terms of trade improve because it receives a higher price for its 
exports. Second, the net welfare gainer with the largest change in allocative efficiency is 
Malaysia. This reflects the fact that Malaysia had the highest levels of tariff protection 
before  the  simulation.  The  removal  of  tariffs  shifted  resources  from  protected  but Methods for Ex Ante Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements   |       27 
 
inefficient  sectors  to more  efficient  sectors. Third,  all  the  net  welfare gainers  have  a 
negative  effect  on  their  returns  to  savings  and  investment. As  mentioned  earlier,  all 
ASEAN countries had trade surpluses in 2004 except for Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet 
Nam. As the GTAP model is a static general equilibrium model, a trade surplus implies 
net  investment  in  foreign  capital  goods.  If  the  domestic  return  to  capital  investment 
increases relative to the foreign return to capital investment, then a country with an initial 
trade surplus suffers a welfare loss. This is the case of the older ASEAN members, 
particularly Thailand.   
 
Table 8 shows that the ASEAN FTA does not benefit the new ASEAN members except 
for Cambodia. It also does not benefit non-ASEAN countries. Cambodia receives a net 
welfare gain from the ASEAN FTA mainly because of terms of trade and investment-
savings effects. The former effect occurs because Cambodia experiences increases in 
export prices in most sectors and lower import prices in  all sectors. The latter effect 
occurs because Cambodia begins with a trade surplus and experiences a fall in the 
relative return to domestic investment. Viet Nam is the country that suffers the largest 
net welfare loss. The loss can be traced primarily to a drop in allocative efficiency. If the 
change in Viet Nam‘s allocative efficiency is broken down by sector, the three worst-
performing  sectors  are  Light  Manufacturing,  Textiles  and  Clothing,  and  Heavy 
Manufacturing.
23 In the detailed trade results for Viet  Nam (not shown), these sectors 
undergo trade diversion through large shifts in imports from non -ASEAN countries to 
ASEAN countries. As such, in these sectors, there is a loss in tariff revenue that 
outweighs any positive consumption and production reallocation effects.  
 
For the ASEAN region as a whole, there is a net welfare gain of USD2,222.6 million. So, 
the ASEAN FTA creates a net benefit for the region even though some countries gain 
and some lose. This comes at the expense of non -ASEAN countries. The PRC, Japan, 
and the rest of East Asia have a total net welfare loss of USD900.2 million, while the rest 
of the world suffers a net drop in welfare of USD1,465.3 million. Therefore, the rest of the 
world bears more of the negative consequences of ASEAN tra de preferences than the 
PRC, Japan, and the rest of East Asia. Table 8 shows that non-ASEAN countries suffer 
mainly due to negative terms of trade effects.  
 
Finally,  we  perform  a  sensitivity  analysis  by  varying  the  parameter  values  for  the 
elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic goods around the provided 
GTAP values by 50%. In the GTAP model, these substitution elasticities are related to 
the Armington elasticities—substitution parameters between goods of different national 
origin—in that  they  have  a constant  ratio  between  them.  So,  a  50%  variation  in the 
values of the substitution elasticities implies a 50% variation in those of the Armington 
elasticities. As both types of elasticities are the crux of any FTA simulation, the results 
should be influenced by their values.
24 As this is for illustrative purposes, we will only 
discuss the real GDP and welfare of Cambodia and Viet Nam in the sensitivity results. 
For percentage changes in real GDP, the estimated standard deviation for Cambodia is 
                                                            
23  RunGTAP includes a tool to decompose each source of welfare changes. Allocative efficiency can be 
decomposed by commodity and by tax type. 
24  We use the Liu quadrature in the sensitivity analysis to vary the elasticities by 50% under a uniform 
distribution and obtain standard deviations for the relevant variables. 28          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 52  
 
extremely small so the real GDP contraction following the ASEAN FTA of –0.1% is likely 
and unaffected by changes in the elasticities. The standard deviation for Viet Nam is 
estimated at 0.08, so our best guess is that the percentage change in Viet Nam‘s real 
GDP lies in the range of –0.04% to –0.36%.
25 In other words, varying the elasticities 
does not change the sign on the percentage change in Vietnamese real GDP. As for the 
welfare effects, assuming that the total welfare variable is normally distributed, t he 
results from the sensitivity analysis can be used to calculate the probability of a negative 
total welfare effect. We find that the probability is 5% for Cambodia and 71% for Viet 
Nam. Therefore, varying the elasticities creates the possibility of a switch in the sign on 
the original welfare estimates for these two countries. 
 
4.3   Strengths and Limitations of the GTAP model 
 
The strengths of the GTAP model include: (i) as a general equilibrium model, it accounts 
for economic changes in all sectors; (ii) it is relatively accessible compared to other CGE 
models; (iii) it comes with a peer-reviewed and fully-documented database and software 
suite;  and  (iv)  it  is  widely-used  by  trade  policy  researchers,  who  can  easily  try  to 
replicate and verify the results of any GTAP study. On the other hand, the GTAP model 
faces the same limitations as other CGE models of trade policy: (i) it is constrained by 
the availability of data, and a lack of data may severely compromise the scope and 
relevance of a study and the researcher‘s ability to model certain trade policies; (ii) it 
involves many parameters, which may be difficult to estimate and validate; and (iii) it 
contains  assumptions  or  characteristics  that  may  not  reflect  real-world  features.  For 
example, in analyzing FTAs, the GTAP model‘s use of the Armington assumption creates 
a bias against findings of trade diversion and, therefore, a bias in favor of FTAs (Lloyd 
and Maclaren, 2004).   
 
A policymaker can assess the quality of a GTAP analysis by focusing on the following 
items.  First,  the  model‘s  assumptions  and  characteristics  should  be  consistent  with 
reality. For example, if the countries being studied are characterized by high rates of 
unemployment,  a  market  structure  in  which  a  few  firms  operate  in  each  sector  with 
economies of scale in production, then using a model with full employment of labor, 
perfect competition, and constant returns to scale—as is the case in the standard GTAP 
model—is inappropriate. The analyst should modify the model so that it represents real 
world  features.
26  In the same vein, if dynamic effects are important, then using the 
standard GTAP model, which is static, may be misleading.   
  
Second,  the  data  used  for  simulations  should  be  timely,  suitable,  and  accurate. 
Researchers using the GTAP model almost always rely on the GTAP database, whose 
sources may not be complete, precise, or up -to-date. As such, the policymaker should 
refer to GTAP‘s documentation to check for the quality of the data used by the GTAP 
modeler. If the policymaker has access to more reliable or comprehensive data (e.g. 
                                                            
25  This assumes that the percentage change in the real GDP variable follows a normal distribution. The 
range shown is the 95% confidence interval. 
26  For  an  example  of  modifying  the  GTAP  model  to  account  for  unemployment  and  changes  in  real 
wages,  see  Kitwiwattanachai,  Nelson,  and  Reed  (2009).  For  an  example  of  modeling  imperfect 
competition and increasing returns to scale in a GTAP model of an EU–Morocco FTA, see Elbehri and 
Hertel (2004). Methods for Ex Ante Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements   |       29 
 
more accurate records of trade flows, tariff revenue, applied tariffs, or types of trade 
barriers), then the modeler should be advised to replace or supplement the data from the 
GTAP database.  
 
Third, the policymaker should be aware that the GTAP model‘s results hinge on the 
parameter  values  used.  In  the  latest  GTAP  database  (version  7),  values  for  the 
Armington and consumer demand elasticities come from recent econometric work by 
Hertel,  Hummels,  Ivanic,  and  Keeney  (2004),  and  Reimer  and  Hertel  (2004), 
respectively,  but  the  values  for  the  other  parameters  (factor  substitution  and  factor 
transformation elasticities) date back to work on the SALTER model in 1991 (Jomini et 
al.,  1991).  Assessing  the  validity  of  econometric  estimates  for  these  parameters  is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but one can at least check whether the data coverage 
and time period of these econometric studies are relevant to the countries and goods 
included  in  the  simulation.  Alternatively,  if  the  simulation  comes  with  a  sensitivity 
analysis, one can see whether changes in key parameter values significantly affect the 
values of important variables such as output, trade, or welfare.  
 
Lastly, a thorough CGE analysis should explain all important results from the simulation. 
The  signs  and  magnitudes  of  the  main  results  should  be  traced  to  the  model‘s 
assumptions  and  structure  or  patterns  in  the  exogenous  variables.  Any  surprising 
numbers  should  also  be  explained.  In the  analysis  of  FTAs,  the results  should,  at  a 
minimum, discern any important developments in the production of regional members, 
preferably by sector, and the evolution of trade and welfare in both regional members 
and outsiders. A good CGE analysis of an FTA should present and carefully interpret 
these results in order to help policymakers make well-founded policy recommendations. 
Table 9 on the next page summarizes the main characteristics of the GTAP model, its 




Table 9: The GTAP model, FTA analysis, and Developing Countries 
 
 
Values/Variables  Notes on Implementation from a 
Developing Country Perspective 
Assumptions in 
the GTAP Model 
The standard GTAP model is based on full 
employment, perfect competition, constant 
returns to scale,  differentiation by national 
origin (the Armington assumption), and no 
dynamic effects. These characteristics are 
modeled with specific functional forms and 
equations. 
 
The modeler has to decide on which 
closure to use (i.e., which set of variables 
to leave as exogenous). The standard 
GTAP closure leaves factor endowments, 
technology, and tax and subsidy rates as 
exogenous variables.   
 
These characteristics may not prevail 
in developing countries. For examples 
of how to change the model to display 
more appropriate characteristics, see 
Elbehri and Hertel (2004) and 
Kitwiwattanachai, Nelson, and Reed 
(2009). 
 
For most FTA scenarios, the GTAP 
standard closure is appropriate. 
Exceptions are scenarios with  
technological changes, endogenous 
taxes and subsidies, or dynamic effects 
associated with investment and capital 
accumulation. 30          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 52  
 
 
Values/Variables  Notes on Implementation from a 
Developing Country Perspective 
 
Data included in 
the GTAP 
database  
Version 7 includes trade, trade protection, 
and input–output data for 113 countries 
and 57 sectors from the reference year 
2004.  
 
If a developing country has more timely 
or reliable data, then it can supplement 
or replace the GTAP trade and trade 
barrier data used for the analysis. 
Important 
parameters 
Goods substitution elasticities, factor 
substitution elasticities, factor 
transformation elasticities, investment 
parameters, and consumer demand 
elasticities 
Chapter 14 of the GTAP 7 database 
documentation explains how these 
parameter values were estimated. 
Modelers may replace them with other 
more suitable values. 
 
Output of the 
GTAP model 
Aggregate level: real GDP, trade, terms of 
trade, and welfare (with sources of welfare 
changes). Sectoral level: output, trade, and 
prices 
These results should be subjected to a 
sensitivity analysis. The RunGTAP 




5.   Concluding Remarks 
 
Countries,  particularly  developing  ones,  are  increasingly  turning  to  regional  trade 
agreements in their efforts to benefit from world markets and overcome the failure of 
multilateral trade negotiations. In this context, it is crucial that policymakers have the 
right tools to evaluate these regional trade agreements and know how to make use of 
these tools.  This paper has presented various methods—trade indicators, SMART, and 
GTAP—to  evaluate  the  economic  effects  of  FTAs.  Each  method  is  explained  as 
concisely  as  possible  and  accompanied  by  examples  mainly  from  ASEAN  and,  in 
particular, the newer ASEAN members: Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Viet Nam. It is hoped 
that the explanations will prove sufficiently useful for gaining a quick understanding of 
the  logical  foundations  of  each  method,  and,  given  the  wide  variety  of  FTA-related 
questions  that  policymakers  have,  the  examples  will  illustrate  which  methods  are 
relevant  to  which  questions.  Further,  given  that  policymakers  work  under  time, 
organizational, and financial constraints, the descriptions of each method‘s requirements 
should be helpful to policymakers when judging the feasibility of using any one method 
and the expected quality of results.  Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the same methods 
would be applicable with some modification in the case of customs unions or other types 
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